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Abstract
Evaluation studies of active labour market policy show different activation measures gen-
erate contradictory results. In the present study, we argue that these contradictory results are
due to the fact that the outcomes of activation measures depend on other institutions. The
outcome measure in this study is the long-term unemployment rate. Two labour market insti-
tutions are of special interest in this context: namely, employment protection and unemploy-
ment benefits. Both institutions, depending on their design, may either increase or decrease the
effectiveness of active labour market policies in lowering long-term unemployment. Based on
an analysis of macro-level data on  countries over a period of  years, our results show that
employment protection strictness and unemployment benefit generosity interact with the way
in which active labour market policies relate to long-term unemployment. Our results also
indicate that, depending on the measure used, active labour market policies fit either in a flex-
ible or in a coordinated labour market. This suggests that active labour market policies can
adhere to both institutional logics, which are encapsulated in different types of measures.
Keywords: institutional complementarity; active labour market policy; long-term
unemployment; employment protection legislation; unemployment benefits
Introduction
Since the nineties, many European welfare states started to transform into social
investment states as a reaction to the changing risks due to the emergence of the
post-industrial society (Van Kersbergen and Hemerijck, ). Within this form
of welfare state, active labour market policies (ALMPs) play a dominant role to
create a more socially inclusive and economically productive labour market
(Morel et al., ). ALMPs are social policy measures that stimulate labour
market participation through human capital investments and job search
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assistance. But activation can also be accomplished with benefits conditionality,
sanctions and policies that have a strong emphasis on work (Crouch and Keune,
, p. ). Examples of ALMPs are training programmes, hiring subsidies or
public employment programmes. As labour market participation is increasingly
becoming a condition for one’s personal and social welfare (Bonoli, ),
reducing and preventing long-term unemployment belong to the central pillars
of ALMPs. However, the evaluation literature on the effects of ALMP is ambig-
uous in its conclusions. Contradicting results on the effects of ALMP on labour
market outcomes are reported (see, for instance, Calmfors et al., ; Martin
and Grubb, ; Martin, ). Although this strand of literature typically
emphasises the level of analysis (macro vs. micro) or the type of ALMP used,
we argue that other labour market institutions also play a role in the observed
effect heterogeneity of ALMPs. Most theories related to ALMP – such as human
capital theory, search theory and statistical discrimination theory – often depart
from an economic rational choice perspective. These theories do not emphasise
the influence other institutions have on the effectiveness of ALMPs. Hence, this
study aims to provide additional insights by studying potential institutional
complementarities that exist between ALMPs and the institutional structure
they are embedded in.
Institutions are social structures that “comprise regulative, normative and
cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resour-
ces, provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott, , p. ). The idea
that institutions are complementary to other institutions plays a fundamental
role in the theoretical ideas on economic and labour market models, such as
Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, ) or flexicurity (Madsen,
). These scholars argue that certain institutions or specific configurations
of these institutions produce optimal results. The effects of the individual insti-
tutions are optimised through the interaction with other institutions. These
interactions between different institutions enhance economic productivity
and competitiveness. This implies that institutional practices should not be ran-
domly distributed and organised across different economic spheres (Hall and
Soskice, , pp. –). Thus, institutional complementarity runs against
the idea of ‘one best way’ but also against the idea that any combination of insti-
tutions will effectively work together (Amable, ). Empirical research shows
that labour market institutions do not only affect the labour market directly but
also interact with other institutions related to labour market outcomes
(Blanchard and Tirole, ; Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl, ). Thus, reasoned
from the notion of institutional complementarity, the efficiency and effective-
ness of ALMP are also influenced by other institutions and their specific
configuration.
In this study, a focus is put on the potential complementarity of ALMPs
with unemployment benefits (UBs) and employment protection legislation
(EPL) for two reasons. First, in most European countries UBs and EPL were
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already in place before ALMP were implemented on a larger scale at the national
level. ALMPs are therefore more embedded in these institutions instead of vice
versa. Furthermore, both institutions affect both sides of the labour market. As
most ALMP studies focus on the supply side, they paint an incomplete picture.
Treating the demand side as a given underplays the role employers play in the
emergence of ALMP effects (Ingold and Stuart, ). Several studies show that
national characteristics indeed play a role in the likelihood that employers engage
in ALMPs (Martin, ; Martin and Swank, ; Swank and Martin, ).
Therefore, by also theorising and analysing the potential influence of the demand
side in ALMP effectiveness, next to the supply side, we try to provide a more com-
plete, although not exhaustive, picture of how potential institutional complemen-
tarities between ALMP and its institutional context come to be.
The research question in this article is: How is the relationship between active
labour market policies and long-term unemployment affected by employment pro-
tection legislation strictness and unemployment benefit generosity? Panel data from
 European countries during  and  were used to study the potential
complementarities in relation the long-term unemployment. As ALMP began
to play a larger role in the social policy mix in most European countries during
the mid-nineties,  is a logical starting point for the analysis.
This article is structured as follows: in the next section we discuss the the-
oretical underpinnings of ALMP, EPL and UBs in their relation to long-term
unemployment. Accordingly, we formulate our hypotheses. Then, we describe
our methodology and present our results. We conclude by answering our
research question and discuss the findings presented in this article.
ALMP and long-term unemployment
According to the program theory of ALMP, three factors play an important role
in how ALMPs influence the long-term unemployment rate. First, ALMPs try to
alter the perception employers have on the (long-term) unemployed related to
decisions during recruitment and selection processes. This alteration of percep-
tion can be accomplished in two ways: namely, by appealing to the economic
self-interest of employers and by reducing the information asymmetry employ-
ers have on the productive capabilities of the applicant. Hiring decisions have a
high level of financial uncertainty for employers due to information asymmetry.
Hence, employers use unemployment duration, among other things, as a screen-
ing tool when making recruitment decisions (Eriksson and Rooth, ). Long-
term unemployment is often associated with the deterioration of skills and the
development of undesirable behavioural traits, i.e. de-socialisation for work
(Blanchard, ). Thus, employers perceive the long-term unemployed as a
bigger financial risk compared to those with no or a shorter unemployment
period. ALMPs try to alter that risk assessment by providing financial incentives
that reduce the financial risk employers have when they hire a long-term
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unemployed individual (Brown and Koettl, ). Examples of such measures
are hiring or wage subsidies.
Another way to alter the perception of employers and increase demand is by
reducing the information asymmetry employers have on the abilities of the
applicant (ibid.) ALMPs try to reduce the stigma that rests upon long-term
unemployment and influence the risk assessment employers make. For instance,
an employer has the opportunity to obtain information about the long-term
unemployed individual through subsidised employment without financial risk.
In turn, long-term unemployed individuals have a chance to show their value to
the employer. However, ALMPs can also enforce the stigma when programmes
are too narrowly targeted at high-risk groups. If people participate in these pro-
grammes, employers can interpret that as a signal for low productivity and may
therefore decide not to hire such a person (Burtless, ). As a result, the labour
market opportunities of these participants are reduced and these programmes
increase long-term unemployment.
Second, ALMPs also aim to influence the long-term unemployment rate
through human capital enhancement. This improves the labour market position
of the (long-term) unemployed, which increases the probability of obtaining
employment. These activation programmes are designed to assist the (long-
term) unemployed by upgrading their human capital. This upgrading should
contribute to a higher probability of finding not only a new job but also one
of higher quality that leads to a sustainable reintegration into the labour market.
Furthermore, they also serve the purpose to increase successful matchmaking in
sectors that are in need of employees with specific skills. This improvement in
matchmaking should then lead to a lower inflow to unemployment and as a
result in a lower long-term unemployment rate (Boone and van Ours, ).
Third, ALMPs also try to influence the search behaviour of the unemployed
by appealing to the economic self-interest of the unemployed with the intent to
reduce the probability of becoming long-term unemployed. This happens in
multiple ways. The most obvious manner is through job search assistance by
councillors of public employment services. They aim to support the unemployed
by providing information on job openings or by controlling their job search
efforts (Brown and Koettl, ). Moreover, it is argued that ALMPs also might
influence job search behaviour in other ways. A change in job search behaviour
can occur prior to mandatory participation in an ALMP programme. The like-
lihood increases that an individual leaves unemployment before the beginning
of the programme, because of the occurrence of the so-called motivation effect.
This effect manifests itself when participating in activation programmes is per-
ceived as less attractive than having a job. The prospect of mandatory partici-
pation is perceived as negative, which in turn increases job search intensity
(Madsen, ). When job search activities are not effective or are purposely
of low quality, mandatory programmes can be used to change job search
   ,       
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279419000515
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Erasmus MC Rotterdam, on 05 Mar 2020 at 12:31:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
behaviour. However, ALMP participation can also prolong the unemployment
duration as it potentially decreases the job search intensity as well. This is also
referred to as the lock-in effect. When people are participating in all sorts of
activation programmes, they put less effort into job search activities. Thus
the unemployment spell is prolonged and the long-term unemployment rate
increases (ibid.). Van Ours () finds that the occurrence of a lock-in effect
is dependent on the time a job seeker participates in a programme. More spe-
cifically, he argues that short-term subsided jobs heighten the likelihood that a
job seeker finds a regular job. But when the duration increases the positive effect
of subsidised jobs decreases as lock-in effects occur.
Linking activation to employment protection strictness and
unemployment benefit generosity
In this section, we will theorise how UBs and EPL might affect the relationship
between ALMP and long-term unemployment. Only hypotheses are formulated
on the moderation effects of UBs and EPL on ALMP and long-term unemploy-
ment. The reason for doing so is that, according to the idea of institutional com-
plementarity, institutional effects are influenced by other institutions. Thus, the
main effects are not of primary concern but the moderated effects are.
Employment protection strictness
It is argued that EPL affects the risk assessment employers make during
recruitment and selection processes. EPL directly influences the firing costs
associated with dismissal through measures such as mandated severance pay
and indirectly via procedural costs. Thus, strict EPL makes it harder and more
costly to fire employees. But EPL also influences the hiring of new employees
indirectly. Due to economic uncertainty, employers are less likely to hire new
employees to avoid high firing costs in the future (Avdagic, ). As hiring
is less risky in labour markets with low levels of employment protection, it is
expected that the potential stigma that is associated with ALMP participation
is less of a concern. Because it is relatively cheap and easy to fire employees
in labour markets with less strict EPL, ALMP participants might get the benefit
of the doubt sooner than in labour markets with strict EPL. Furthermore, the
direct effect of ALMPs on long-term unemployment is also dependent on labour
demand. If employers are more hesitant to hire new employees as a result of
strict EPL, then, on an aggregate level, labour demand should be lower.
Because of low labour demand, it is harder to find a job, even for highly skilled
job seekers (de Beer and Schils, ). Hence, the probability of obtaining
employment diminishes, even if one portrays intense job search behaviour
and has sufficient human capital because there are too few vacancies the
long-term unemployed can be activated in.
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Furthermore, it is also argued that EPL influences which type of human
capital is primarily developed. Two types can be distinguished: namely, specific
human capital and general human capital. The latter refers to human capital that
holds value to multiple employers, while the first refers to human capital that
only has value for one specific employer (Becker, ). For people who possess
high amounts of specific human capital and low amounts of general human cap-
ital, it is harder to obtain new employment compared to people with the oppo-
site human capital composition. The composition of one’s human capital is
argued to be influenced by the level of employment protection strictness. As
it is relatively easy to be fired in a labour market with less strict EPL, it is impor-
tant to have higher amounts of general human capital to be able to easily switch
between employers. Alternatively, in labour markets with strict EPL, it is in the
employer’s interest to invest in employees as it is more difficult to fire them.
Moreover, it is also less risky for the employee to invest in firm-specific skills
as they are more protected against arbitrary dismissal (Hall and Soskice,
). Thus, the probability is higher that the long-term unemployed in flexible
labour markets have more general skills and need fewer human capital invest-
ments to be able to find a job compared to the long-term unemployed in labour
markets with strict EPL. In other words, with the same amount of human capital
advancement, the probability is higher that a long-term unemployed individual
obtains employment in a labour market with less strict EPL than in a labour
market with strict EPL.
To summarise, it can be argued that stricter EPL decreases the ALMP-
effectiveness concerning the reduction of long-term unemployment and may
even induce a positive relationship between ALMP and long-term unemploy-
ment. Stricter EPL reinforces the consequences of stigmatisation through
ALMP programme participation and lowers labour demand. Both effects make
the transition into employment harder. Additionally, less general human capital
tends to be present in this type of labour market, implying that more activation
resources are needed to obtain employment. Thus, we hypothesise that the rela-
tion between ALMP effort and long-term unemployment is positively moderated
by EPL strictness (H).
However, the opposite is also possible. It is also argued that more negative
selection takes place during the hiring and firing of employees in labour markets
with less strict EPL. Individuals with a weaker labour market position have a
much higher chance of being fired, as it is relatively cheap to dispose of
unwanted employees. At the same time, chances to reintegrate into the labour
market are lower: for example, because these employees lack the right skill set or
belong to a discriminated minority. These negative selection processes are sup-
posed to happen more in labour markets with less strict EPL than those with
strict EPL because more people are hired and fired within the same time frame
(Madsen, ). This implies that the composition of the long-term unemployed
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differs between both types of labour markets. Labour markets with less strict
EPL should contain more unemployed who have a greater distance from the
labour market than those with strict EPL. This potentially also affects the effec-
tiveness of ALMP. As employment histories are used as signals during recruit-
ment and selection processes, very inconsistent employment histories signal a
higher risk to the hiring employer. Moreover, these turbulent labour market
experiences might also result in discouragement and decreased job search activ-
ities, as the benefits do not outweigh the costs. This implies that the ALMP cli-
entele of both types of labour markets differs on average. Consequently,
activation programmes in labour markets with less strict EPL potentially deal
on average with individuals with a greater distance from the labour market than
activation programmes in labour markets with strict EPL. Fewer activation
resources are needed in labour markets with strict EPL because the average
ALMP participant has less distance to the labour market. We hypothesise that
the relation between ALMP effort and long-term unemployment is negatively
moderated by EPL strictness (H).
Unemployment benefit generosity
The effects of UBs on long-term unemployment are heavily debated in wel-
fare state literature. On the one hand, scholars state that generous welfare sys-
tems provide economic protection against poverty. These arrangements protect
people against poverty and its negative consequences on job search outcomes.
Due to financial support, the long-term unemployed are better able to improve
their skills and the quality of their job search (den Broeder, , p. ). The
long-term unemployed do not suffer from stress related to poverty and are
therefore better capable of improving and sustaining the quality of their job
search efforts. Research shows that poverty drastically reduces the chance of
(re-)employment (Caminada et al., ). This implies that ALMP participants
in labour markets with generous UB schemes are better able to fully participate
in activation programmes than those in labour markets with less generous UB
schemes. This should result in higher quality human capital development due to
lower levels of stress induced by the threat of the negative consequences of
income loss. Furthermore, their increased search behaviour intensity, due to
activation measures, should also lead to more sustainable labour market integra-
tion. As income is provided for, they are better able to find a suitable job that
matches their work history and skill level instead of taking any job to prevent the
negative consequences of loss of income. This suggests that future unemploy-
ment is less likely to occur.
Moreover, it is also argued that generous UBs decrease long-term unem-
ployment as it upholds labour demand and thereby improves unemployment
outflow. Upholding labour demand is facilitated through the economic stabili-
sation of consumer demand. When people lose their income, the economy is
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negatively affected as consumer demand decreases. In this way, labour demand
decreases as well because fewer workers are needed to meet consumer demand.
By providing income for those who are not able to acquire income through the
labour market, consumer demand is stabilized (Hemerijck, ). This implies
that labour markets with more generous UBs are less volatile than their counter-
parts. This reduces the economic uncertainty for employers and, thus, makes
them more likely to hire workers, as their economic future is less uncertain.
Through economic stabilisation, labour demand is upheld, which increases a
higher probability of obtaining employment with the same level of job search
intensity or amount of human capital.
To summarise, more UB generosity increases the effectiveness of ALMPs in
reducing long-term unemployment. By providing protection against poverty,
generous UBs may improve the matchmaking between ALMP participants
and potential employers. Additionally, UBs also contribute to economic stabil-
ity, which increases employment opportunities for ALMP participants. Hence,
we hypothesise that, through income security and economic stabilisation, the
relation between ALMP effort and long-term unemployment is negatively mod-
erated by UB generosity (H).
On the other hand, scholars argue that by providing income security a
financial disincentive is given to the unemployed to obtain employment.
Generous UBs tend to artificially raise and increase the reservation wage.
The reservation wage is the minimum wage rate at which an unemployed indi-
vidual is willing to accept a job. Therefore, when the reservation wage increases,
the likelihood of finding employment decreases as well (Feldstein and Poterba,
). As a result, the probability of becoming long-term unemployed increases
too. Furthermore, the financial disincentive also influences the level of job
search intensity. Empirical research shows that unemployment benefits
recipients have less contact with employers, and spend fewer monthly hours
and money on job search activities compared to non-recipients (Pedersen
and Smith, ), and also shows that job search activities tend to increase dur-
ing the last period of the duration of benefit receipt (Krueger and Mueller, ).
This implies that the unemployed start to search more actively for employment
when they perceive potential economic hardship in the near future. Thus,
through an increased reservation wage and reduced need to find income
through labour market participation, the intended effects of ALMP are
countered. The need for ALMP participants to obtain employment is reduced,
which leads to lower job search intensity compared to participants in a labour
market with less generous UB. ALMP participation is more likely to lead to a
lock-in effect, which increases the probability of long-term unemployment when
UB generosity is high. Our hypothesis is that the relation between ALMP
effort and long-term unemployment is positively moderated by UB generos-
ity (H).
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Data and methods
Data
For this study, we partly used the European Labour Market Resilience
(ELMaR) dataset, which is a publicly available dataset that contains cross-
national and longitudinal (-) data originating from several data sour-
ces: namely, the OECD, Eurostat, the Data Base on Institutional Characteristics
of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS)
and the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data Set. ELMaR covers 
European countries and  observations (Bigos et al., ). We added data
to this dataset from the OECD database. We selected cases with complete infor-
mation about all the variables used for the analysis. After this selection, the data-
set used for the analysis contained  observations from  countries.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable in our model is long-term unemployment. We
looked at the share of the total labour force who are long-term unemployed.
The labour force consists of the total of employed and unemployed persons.
A large share of long-term unemployment in the total labour force implies both
lower inclusiveness and lower economic competitiveness and productivity.
However, a large share of long-term unemployment in total unemployment does
not necessarily imply low inclusiveness and low economic competitiveness and
productivity. If the total unemployment is very low, but the percentage of long-
term unemployment in the total unemployment is high, this still would be con-
sidered an inclusive and competitive labour market. Hence, we measured long-
term unemployment as the percentage of unemployed persons of the total
labour force who have been out of a job longer than a year. The data we used
originates from Eurostat (for a full explanation see Eurostat, ). To correct
for a skewed distribution, we log-transformed this variable.
Independent variables
Standard procedure in comparative social policy research is to use public
spending, usually expressed as a percentage of GDP, to measure policy intensity.
Gilbert () argues that this measure is difficult to interpret because it neglects
population size, wealth and is not corrected for need. To accommodate these
critiques, ALMP effort is therefore expressed as the product of ALMP spending
as the percentage of GDP and level of GDP per capita in purchasing power par-
ities (PPPs) and constant prices (). This corrects the spending measure for
population size and wealth of a country. This product was then divided by the
unemployment rate to correct the measure for the level of need. Furthermore,
Clasen et al. () argue that it is imperative to differentiate between the spe-
cific programmes in ALMP because they might have differential effects. We
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differentiated ALMP into three distinct groups: namely, public employment
services and administration (ALMP pes), training programmes (ALMP train-
ing), and employment programmes consisting of employment incentives, shel-
tered and supported employment and rehabilitation, and direct job creation
(ALMP employment).
To measure employment protection strictness, the EPL-indicators of the
OECD were used. Two indicators were used, one to measure employment pro-
tection strictness regarding regular contracts and one to measure employment
protection strictness regarding temporary employment. Several versions exist of
the EPL indicator. We used the first version of this indicator because it contains
data from a longer time period. The indicator on regular EPL is based on  items
concerning regulations for individual dismissals, including notification proce-
dures, possibilities of delay before the notice can start, the length of notice peri-
ods, severance payments, definitions of justified or unfair dismissal, the length of
the trial period, the compensation following unfair dismissal, and the possibili-
ties of reinstatement after unfair dismissal. The temporary EPL indicator of the
OECD is based on  items that provide information on valid cases for using
fixed-term contracts, the maximum number and maximum cumulated duration
of successive fixed term-contracts, types of work that are legal for temporary
work agency (TWA) employment, the restrictions on the number of TWA
assignments and the maximum cumulated duration of TWA assignments
(for full detail, see OECD, b).
Unemployment benefit generosity is operationalised using the net replace-
ment rates as devised by Scruggs et al. (). The replacement rate covers only
the national insurance provisions earned without income testing and it excludes
additional provisions under a collective bargaining contract. Scruggs calculates
the net replacement rate for “a fictive average worker in the manufacturing sec-
tor who is  years old, has been working for the  years preceding the loss of
income or the benefit period” (ibid, p.). Scruggs takes account of two household
types: namely, a single and family household. The single household type refers to
a person who has an average earning level, is living alone and has no children or
other dependents. The family household refers to a person with an average earn-
ing level and lives together with a dependent spouse with no income. This couple
has two children aged  and . We calculated the average of the two household
types to provide a more general indication for the level of UB generosity of a
given labour market. We lagged all the independent variables with one year,
as it takes a year to become long-term unemployed.
Control variables
In this study, we control for two types of economic conditions: namely, eco-
nomic growth and GDP per capita. Economic growth is included in the analysis,
because during times of economic downturn the long-term unemployment rate
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increases. But at the same time governments tend to adjust their policy to
dampen the effects of the economic downturn. Economic growth is measured
as the percentage change in GDP per head of the population. Because we want to
make a comparison across time, we used data in constant prices (). This is
more appropriate, as this also controls for relative prices over time in addition to
those across countries (OECD, a). We also controlled for the level of GDP
per capita as this might be correlated with the policies used and the long-term
unemployment rate. In wealthy countries, the risk of long-term unemployment
is lower (see Figure  on page ). At the same time, countries with high GDP
per capita (for instance, the Nordic countries) spend more on ALMP. GDP per
capita is expressed in PPPs and in constant prices (), which allows for
within- and between-country comparisons.
Moreover, we also controlled for demographic influences as they may also
be correlated with both the policies and long-term unemployment. The age
structure of a country may also confound with the relationship between social
policy and long-term unemployment. Older aged people have a higher chance of
becoming long-term unemployed due to age discrimination but at the same time
activation policies are targeted at specific groups, such as older workers (Taylor
and Walker, ). We controlled for the ratio of older aged people living in a
country using the old age dependency ratio. The ratio is measured as the total
number of people who are of an age that is higher than the working age
( and over) compared to the total number people of working age (from 
to ).
Another demographic factor that potentially confounds with the relation-
ship between ALMP and long-term unemployment is labour migration. For the
long-term unemployed, migration may seem like a viable option in procuring
employment. When large numbers of long-term unemployed people immigrate
to another country, the long-term unemployment rate reduces as well. When
migration is not taken into account, the false conclusion may arise that certain
types of policy are responsible for the reduction of long-term unemployment.
For instance, the Baltic states are characterised by low levels of social protection
but at the same time high levels of migration during the financial crisis due to
deteriorating social and economic circumstances (Sippola, ). Migration is
measured using the crude net migration rate. The Crude Net Migration rate
is the ratio of the difference between the total change of the population and
the natural change of the population compared to the average population in
the period of one year per  inhabitants.
Furthermore, we also control for characteristics of the industrial relations
system. Due to the influence the social partners have on the formation of social
policies (Gordon, ; Martin, ), we included union density and how
collective wage setting is coordinated to control for possible confounding.
Union density was measured as the ratio of wage and salary earners who
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are trade union members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earn-
ers. Five categories were included to denote the coordination of wage setting:
namely () fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual firms
or plants () mixed industry and firm-level bargaining, weak government
coordination through minimum wage setting or wage indexation () negotia-
tion guidelines based on centralized bargaining () wage norms based on cen-
tralized bargaining by peak associations with or without government
involvement and () maximum or minimum wage rates or increases
based on centralized bargaining. We also lagged the control variables with
one year; with the exception of economic growth, which is lagged with  years.
In Table  the descriptive statistics of the variables used for the regression anal-
ysis are presented.
Methods and analysis
The hierarchical structure of our data, with time nested in countries, leads
to biased estimates if not corrected for due to correlated errors. A fixed effects
model can be used to analyse clustered data because it corrects the error
structure and also controls for time-consistent unobserved heterogeneity
(Allison, ). The data were analysed using the plm-package in R, which
transforms the variables to deviations from the country-specific means to
TABLE : Descriptive statistics (N= )
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Regular EPL . . . .
Temporary EPL . . . .
UB generosity . . . .
Overall ALMP . . . .
ALMP pes . . . .
ALMP employment . . . .
ALMP training . . . .
Economic growth . . –. .
GDP per capita (/) . . . .
Old age dependency ratio . . . .
Crude net migration rate . . –. .
Union density . . . .
Coordination of wage setting
Fragmented wage bargaining .
Mixed industry and firm-level
bargaining
.
Negotiation guidelines based on
centralized bargaining
.
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address the error structure and time-constant unobserved heterogeneity.
Additionally, to check the robustness of the results, we also excluded one
country at a time and re-estimated the models to investigate the influence of
potential outliers due to the non-random nature of the sample.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Figure  shows the boxplot of the long-term unemployment rate differen-
tiated by country. The white boxes depict the range between  percentile and 
percentile of the data (interquartile range – IQR); thus the longer the white box
is, the more volatile the long-term unemployment rate of a country is. The
vertical lines in the white boxes depict the median ( percentile), and the
Figure . Long-term unemployment rate between  and 
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horizontal lines reach to the furthest data point within . times the IQR. Scores
that exceed this range are displayed as a black dot. The diamond shapes depict
the mean score of a country. Countries with high variances in their long-term
unemployment rates are Poland, Spain and Ireland. This means that these
countries have a highly volatile long-term unemployment rate. The Slovak
Republic has the highest mean long-term unemployment rate and Norway
the lowest.
Regression statistics
The results of the fixed effects regression analysis are presented in Table .
The analysis with all countries shows that overall ALMP, and specific pro-
grammes, interact with EPL strictness and UB generosity. However, some of
these interactions lose their significance during the sensitivity analysis. The
interactions that are less robust are italicised in Table  and the results of the
sensitivity analysis are presented in Table .
To test the hypotheses that either EPL positively (H) or negatively (H)
moderates the relation between ALMPs and long-term unemployment, we esti-
mated model ,  and . Model  in Table  shows that both temporary and
regular EPL negatively moderate the relation between ALMP in general and
long-term unemployment. Both interactions are influenced by the composition
of the sample but the direction of the regression coefficient remains the same
when a single country is excluded from the sample. Thus, hypothesis H and
H are rejected in the case of regular and temporary EPL in relation to overall
ALMP effort. This implies that in general ALMPs are not complementary to EPL
in relation to reducing long-term unemployment.
Concerning the specific programmes of ALMP, model  shows that tempo-
rary EPL negatively interacts with ALMP pes and ALMP training and does not
interact with ALMP employment. The interaction between ALMP training and
temporary EPL is no longer significant during the sensitivity analysis.
However, the regression coefficient does not differ substantially and the signifi-
cance levels only marginally cross the critical value. This implies a statistical power
issue instead of the influence of an outlier. The interaction between ALMP pes and
temporary EPL does not seem to be affected by the composition of the sample.
The plots of the interaction effects are presented in Figure . The left panel in
Figure  shows that when temporary EPL becomes stricter the negative effect
of ALMP pes on long-term unemployment becomes stronger. With regard to
the interaction between ALMP training and temporary EPL, the middle panel
in Figure  shows that when temporary EPL becomes less strict the effect of
ALMP training is positive but when temporary EPL strictness increases the rela-
tion between ALMP training and long-term unemployment is negative. Our
results support hypothesis H in the case of temporary EPL with regard to
ALMP pes and ALMP training and reject hypothesis H. In the case of ALMP
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employment, both hypotheses H and H are rejected. This suggests that tempo-
rary EPL is complementary to ALMP pes and ALMP training when the level of
strictness increases. However, ALMP training seems to form a discomplementar-
ity with temporary EPL when the level of strictness decreases.
The results from model  also show that regular EPL negatively moderates
the relation of ALMP pes and ALMP training with long-term unemployment,
and positively moderates the relation between ALMP employment and long-
term unemployment. However, all interactions lose their significance when a
specific country is excluded from the analysis. Hypotheses H and H are there-
fore rejected in the case of regular EPL and specific ALMP programmes. As a
result, our analysis indicates that specific ALMP programmes do not form com-
plementarities with regular EPL in reducing long-term unemployment.
To test the hypotheses that either UB generosity positively (H) or nega-
tively (H) moderates the relation between ALMPs and long-term unemploy-
ment, we estimated model  and . The results from model  show that UBs
positively moderate the relation between overall ALMP and long-term unem-
ployment. This outcome is robust. With regard to the specific programmes,
model  shows that the interaction (between UBs and ALMP employment) is
the main driver of the positive interaction. The right panel in Figure  illustrates
the interaction between UBs and ALMP employment and shows that when UB
generosity becomes less generous the effect of ALMP employment becomes neg-
ative but when the level of UB generosity increases the effect becomes positive.
The results support hypothesis H for overall ALMP and ALMP employment
programmes, and reject hypothesis H. Hence, UBs are complementary to
ALMPs, and especially ALMP employment, in reducing long-term unemploy-
ment when UBs become less generous.
UB generosity also seems to negatively moderate the effect of ALMP pes
and ALMP training on the long-term unemployment rate. However, the
observed negative interaction between UBs and ALMP training is heavily influ-
enced by Ireland because the coefficient changes its direction when Ireland is
Figure . Plots of interactions
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TABLE : Fixed effect linear regression on log long-term unemployment
Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model 
ALMP total –.*** –.***
(.) (.)
ALMP pes –. –.*** –.*** –.***
(.) (.) (.) (.)
ALMP training . –. . .**
(.) (.) (.) (.)
ALMP employment –.** –. –.* –.**
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Regular EPL –. –.* –. –. –. –.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Temporary EPL –. –.* –. –. –.*** –.*
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
UBs .** .** .** .* .* .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Regular EPL*ALMP total –.*
(.)
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Model  Model  Model  Model  Model  Model 
Regular EPL*ALMP pes –.**
(.)
Regular EPL*ALMP training –.***
(.)
Regular EPL*ALMP employment .***
(.)
Temporary EPL*ALMP pes –.***
(.)
Temporary EPL*ALMP training –.**
(.)








Economic growth –. –.* –.* –.* –.** –.*
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
GDP per capita (/) –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.*** –.***
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Union density rate –. –.* –.* –.* –.* –.**
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Coordination of wage setting (ref: fragmented wage bargaining)
Mixed industry and firm-level bargaining –. –. –. . –. .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Negotiation guidelines based on centralized bargaining –. –. –. –. –. –.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Wage norms based on centralized bargaining –. –.* –. –. –.* –.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Maximum/minimum wage rates increases based on
centralized bargaining
–. –.* –. –. –. –.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Old age dependency ratio –.*** –.*** –.*** –.** –.*** –.***
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
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excluded. When Portugal, Sweden or the United Kingdom is excluded from the
sample, the observed negative interaction between UBs and ALMP pes is no
longer significant. Both hypotheses H and H are rejected with regard to
ALMP pes and ALMP training. This implies that ALMP pes and ALMP training
are not complementary to UBs in lowering the long-term unemployment rate.
Conclusion and discussion
This study investigates how potential institutional complementarities influence
the relationship between ALMP and long-term unemployment. More specifi-
cally, we investigated how and if EPL strictness and UB generosity moderate
the relation between ALMPs and long-term unemployment. This enhances
our insights into the observed effect heterogeneity of ALMPs that is reported
in the literature on intended and unintended effects of ALMP.
The results show that ALMPs have differential effects on long-term unem-
ployment depending on the institutional configuration of the labour market.
Increased effort in public employment services and ALMP training programmes
are associated with less long-term unemployment when temporary employment
protection becomes stricter. One explanation is that strict temporary EPL
decreases the likelihood of adverse selection processes. On average ALMP
participants are less disadvantaged in such labour markets and therefore need
fewer activation efforts (e.g. job search assistance or training) to successfully
re-integrate into the labour market. Another explanation is that strict temporary
EPL provides a necessary condition for ALMP participants to enjoy more
employment stability when obtaining a new job. Employment stability increases
the probability of sustainable reintegration into the labour market (Wulfgramm
and Fervers, ) and therefore reduces the probability of future long-term




Regular EPL * overall ALMP Portugal b=–., p=.
Regular EPL * ALMP pes Sweden b=–., p=.
Regular EPL * ALMP training Ireland b=–., p=.
Regular EPL * ALMP employment Netherlands b=–., p=.
Temporary EPL * overall ALMP Norway b=–., p=.
Spain b=–., p=.
Temporary EPL * ALMP training Ireland b=–., p=.
Spain b=–., p=.
UB * ALMP training Ireland b= ., p=.
UB * ALMP pes Portugal b=–., p=.
Sweden b=–., p=.
United Kingdom b=–., p=.
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unemployment. Furthermore, employment programmes seem to become more
effective when UB generosity is decreased. This might be due to a reduction in
the financial disincentive caused by UB generosity, which in turn reduces the
possibility of a lock-in effect that follows from ALMP employment programme
participation.
More generally, the observed complementarities might be based on two dif-
ferent institutional logics. The complementarity between more strict temporary
EPL and ALMPs (like public employment services and training programmes)
might be based on a logic emphasising durable labour relations, which lies at
the heart of the coordinated market economy as identified in the Varieties of
Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice, ). Norway provides an
empirical example of this complementarity due to its strict temporary EPL.
Duell et al. () show that Norwegian activation measures lowered the unem-
ployment rate. Dahl and Lorentzen () also show that in Norway ALMP
training programmes seem to increase the earnings of all participants, while
employment programmes do not have an overall effect but have differential
effects for various subgroups. This suggests that the complementarity between
strict temporary EPL and ALMP measures is more focused on creating sustain-
able and durable labour relations in overall. Nevertheless, the logic of the com-
plementary between less generous UBs and ALMP employment programmes
might be based on a faster allocation of labour to adhere to the demand for flexi-
ble labour instead of forming durable labour relations, which fits within the cen-
tral logic of the liberal market economy as described in the VoC (Hall and
Soskice, ). As Wulfgramm and Fervers () show, in countries with less
generous UBs re-employment stability is reduced because of poor matchmaking
resulting from economic hardship. Thus, even though the combination of
decreased UB generosity and increased ALMP employment programme effort
is associated with less long-term unemployment, it might also be associated with
more re-employment instability. The United Kingdom might serve as an exam-
ple because it has relatively less generous UBs and has shown activation suc-
cesses in the past (Martin, ) but also shows an increase in involuntary
temporary employment (Green and Livanos, ). Both examples of
Norway and the United Kingdom suggest that complementarities involving
ALMPs can reduce long-term unemployment but might differ in reintegration
quality depending on the institutional configuration of the labour market.
Hence, future research should focus on how specific institutional complemen-
tarities are related to the employment conditions and stability of former ALMP
participants.
Furthermore, the observation that specific ALMPs are influenced by other
institutions also indicates that the generalisability of micro-level studies on the
efficacy of ALMP programmes is somewhat limited. Because these studies were
conducted within a specific institutional setting, the observed effects might be
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the product of an interaction between the programme under study and other
aspects of the institutional configuration. Researchers who perform micro-level
studies on ALMPs should be aware of and reflect on the possibility that other
institutions affect the workings of the programme under study. Knowledge pro-
duced in one institutional setting is not automatically transferable to another
institutional setting, which implies that benchmarking should be performed
with care. Additionally, policymakers should either select specific ALMP meas-
ures that fit within the institutional structure of the labour market or make
adjustments in the institutional structure to improve the efficiency of ALMP
programmes to reduce long-term unemployment.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. The measures used are very broad and
may give a misrepresentation of the situation. For example, the EPL indicator of
the OECD is a composite indicator and a low score in one domain can be com-
pensated in another domain with a high score. As a result, the possibility exists
that two countries that have a different EPL signature have the same score.
Furthermore, we only looked at ALMP spending at the national level.
Variations in within-country ALMP effort and practice are not measured as sec-
toral and municipal spending also varies. The spending variable also does not
account for spending on ALMPs of the social partners. Thus, by only measuring
national governmental spending the total effort is potentially under-estimated.
Another limitation is that it is not known to whom the activation resources are
primarily allocated and in what way. Thus, more detailed data is needed to fur-
ther investigate how ALMPs affect long-term unemployment and in this way
rule out the possibility of an ecological fallacy.
The estimated coefficients may also be biased due to reverse causality. It is
plausible that long-term unemployment also explains some variance in the insti-
tutional configuration of a labour market. The current state of the labour market
influences the decisions of policymakers and induces a positive correlation
between long-term unemployment and labour market policies. Thus, this bi-
causality might lead to a biased estimation of the regression coefficient.
However, Avdagic and Salardi (, p. ) do not find clear empirical evi-
dence for the hypothesis that causality runs from unemployment to labour mar-
ket policies. This implies that this endogeneity problem is less problematic than
one might initially think. Furthermore, this paper follows a linear line of reason-
ing and therefore utilises a linear analytical model to investigate the hypothes-
ised complementarities. However, non-linear interactions are also a possibility
(Hainmueller et al., ). Hence, future research should also explore and theo-
rise potential non-linear complementarities as this fell outside of the scope of
this study. Despite these limitations, we believe that this study provides useful
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and new insights in the study of labour market institutions and in particu-
lar ALMP.
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